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Abstract This article focuses on two issues involved in the formation and political 
trajectory of populist representations within political antagonism. First, it explores the 
role of crisis in the articulation of populist discourse. This problematic is far from new 
within theories of populism but has recently taken a new turn. We thus purport to 
reconsider the way populism and crisis are related, mapping the different modalities 
this relation can take and advancing further their theorization from the point of view 
of a discursive theory of the political, drawing primarily on the Essex School 
perspective initially developed by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. Second, this 
will involve focusing on the antagonistic language games developed around populist 
representations, something that has not attracted equal attention. Highlighting the 
need to study anti-populism together with populism, focusing on their mutual 
constitution, we will test the ensuing theoretical framework in an analysis of 
SYRIZA, a recent and, as a result, under-researched example of egalitarian, 
inclusionary populism emerging within the European crisis landscape.  
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Research on populism has diachronically placed emphasis on the role of 
representation, no matter whether this is theorized in terms of a formal-discursive 
(Laclau, 1977; 2005a), structural (Canovan, 1999; 2005) or ideational manner (Mudde 
and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012). Thus populism typically involves the activity of 
political agents (movements, parties, leaders, etc.) claiming to express popular 
interests and to represent associated identities and demands (the true will of the 
‘people’) against an establishment, an elite, that undermines them and forestalls their 
satisfaction.  
This paper focuses on two crucial issues involved in the formation and 
political trajectory of such representations within the framework of political 
antagonism:  
1. On their conditions of possibility and, in particular, on the crucial if ambivalent role 
of crisis. This problematic is far from new within populism research but has recently 
taken a new turn beyond its many but limited existing articulations.  
2. On the complex and antagonistic language games developed around such claims 
when different political actors attempt to come to terms, resolve and/or manipulate a 
crisis conjuncture. Such games can involve recognition and idealization, rejection and 
demonization of both ‘the people’ as well as of ‘populism’. Perhaps surprisingly, this 
second rubric has not attracted equal attention. 
Albeit brief references to the connection between crisis and populism abound 
in the relevant bibliography (Knight, 1998; Taggart, 2000; De la Torre, 2000), 
detailed treatments are rare and many of its aspects remain obscure. For example, 
‘crisis’ is usually utilized in a taken-for-granted way that pays little attention to the 
gaps between what is perceived to be its ‘objective’ conditions and what could be 
seen as its ‘social construction’, i.e. its representation in populist discourse. Albeit 
 3 
much discussed in broader theoretical debates, this angle has not been adequately 
registered within populism research. The starting point of this paper is that no 
rigorous theorization of populist politics can proceed without further exploring the 
way populism and crisis are related, without, that is, theorizing the different 
modalities this relation can take (see, for a recent such attempt, Moffitt, 2015; also see 
Roberts, 2015). At the same time, it seems equally if not even more important to insist 
on studying anti-populism together with populism, focusing on their mutual 
constitution and reproduction. And not only on philosophical grounds, in a bid to 
register the importance of the irreducible dialectic between identity and difference 
(Saussure, 1959; Connolly, 1991). But also because populist discourses never operate 
in a vacuum and need to be situated within the context of political antagonism, within 
the broader hegemonic struggle, which is energized more often than not by crisis 
situations, real or/and imagined. This is impossible without focusing on the emerging 
populism/anti-populism frontier, and, in this context, it is a mystery why the 
‘important notion of anti-populism […] has never really been studied or thematized as 
such’ (Ostiguy, 2009, pp. 23-4).  
We shall try, in this paper, to address both these issues – the role of crisis and 
the importance of the populism/anti-populism frontier – as well as to highlight the, 
often neglected yet revealing, interconnection between them. Addressing the first one 
requires one to raise the following line of questioning: How are crisis conjunctures 
related to populist phenomena? In particular, is it possible to account in an integrated 
way for both the Real as well as the Symbolic aspects of crises, for crisis as a trigger 
for as well as a construction of populist discourse? Our main hypothesis here is that 
theories of political discourse (Laclau) and cultural political economy (Sum & Jessop) 
can greatly advance such an orientation. Addressing the second obliges us to pose a 
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second set of questions: Are populist discourses the only ones that put forward their 
own constructions of crisis attributing the blame to what they portray as the 
establishment? What about the constructions of anti-populist discourses blaiming 
populism itself? Our second hypothesis is that a comprehensive theory of populism 
must be able to account for the complex choreography between populism and anti-
populism in a rigorous way. These will be the main research questions orienting our 
inquiry and the main hypotheses explored.  
The paper starts with a critical discussion of available models of analysis 
demonstrating significant lacunae and suggesting ways to effectively address them 
theoretically. The subsequent empirical analysis mainly focuses on Greece and the 
party formation of SYRIZA, a very recent and, as a result, under-researched case of 
contemporary populism emerging within a severe crisis conjuncture and thus offering 
a suitable example. We conclude by articulating a more comprehensive model linking 
together crisis, representation and the populism/anti-populism divide. 
  
Modalities of Crisis and Populism: Trigger or Performative Construction? 
 
Conceptual background 
 
Like ‘populism’, ‘crisis’ constitutes a complex and ambivalent concept. Originating 
from ancient Greek medical and juridical discourses (see Koselleck, 1988, p. 103; 
Perezous, 2007, p. 101), ‘crisis’ has historically signified both a critical conjuncture (a 
meaning emanating from medical discourse) and a final judgment (a sense originating 
from the juridical field). Moving into the 20th century, we encounter in the work of 
the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci the confluence between these two etymological 
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origins of the term in a bid to account for political crises, crises of political meaning 
and orientation, beyond economic reductionism. As Gramsci, who had captured 
before anybody else the representational/discursive dimension of crises (Hay, 1999, p. 
335), points out, ‘[i]t may be ruled out that immediate economic crises of themselves 
produce fundamental historical events; they can simply create a terrain more 
favourable to the dissemination of certain modes of thought, and certain ways of 
posing and resolving questions involving the entire subsequent development of 
national life’ (Gramsci, 1971, p. 184). Indeed Gramsci’s take manages to combine the 
problematics of crisis, representation, hegemony and mobilization, to which we shall 
return: 
[T]he crisis of the ruling class’s hegemony, [...] occurs either because the 
ruling class has failed in some major political undertaking for which it has 
requested, or forcibly extracted, the consent of the broad masses […] or 
because huge masses […] have passed suddenly from a state of political 
passivity to a certain activity, and put forward demands which taken 
together, albeit not organically formulated, add up to a revolution. A 
‘crisis of authority’ is spoken of: this is precisely the crisis of hegemony, 
or general crisis of the State (Gramsci, 1971, p. 210). 
Last but not least, Gramsci highlights the ambivalent and largely open character of the 
outcomes of crisis, formulating the oft-quoted phrase that crisis ‘consists precisely in 
the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born’ (Gramsci 1971, p. 276; also 
see Koselleck, 1988, p. 127).  
 More recently, within the field of political science, many of the aforementioned 
characteristics of crisis have been rigorously restated and further developed by Colin 
Hay. Hay is right when, partly drawing on Kosseleck, he locates within ‘crisis’ the 
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cohabitation of two distinct dimensions, that of objective contradiction leading a given 
system into a phase of instability with unpredictable consequences, on the one hand, 
and that of subjective intervention which signifies and represents this instability in 
particular ways. While objectivist conceptions of crisis tend to obscure this dual and 
ambiguous character, Hay attempts to underline it by clearly distinguishing systemic 
contradictions or failures, that is to say condensations of such contradictions, and 
crises understood as decisive interventions on behalf of a variety of social actors 
through which these contradictions are identified, highlighted and meaningfully 
represented (Hay, 1999, p. 323). 
Within the populism literature, associations between crisis conjunctures and 
the emergence of populist discourses and movements is a common place. The 
connection between periods of crisis and the development of populist reactions has 
been amply discussed within the populism literature (for a starting point, see Taggart, 
2000, pp. 2, 4-5, 93-94, 117). Indeed most analyses of populist phenomena claim that 
they emerge within a crisis context (de la Torre and Arnson, 2013, p. 18). 
Furthermore, this is something that seems to bridge mainstream approaches like the 
one put forward by Taggart with heterodox ones such as the one put forward by 
Ernesto Laclau. In the words of the latter: ‘the emergence of populism is historically 
linked to a crisis of the dominant ideological discourse, which in turn is part of more 
general social crisis’  (Laclau, 1977, p. 175; also see Moffitt, 2015, p. 191). With 
regards to peronism, the former adds that the invocation of a sense of crisis has played 
an important role in peronism and has highlighted the importance of leadership 
(Taggart, 2000, p. 66). In this sense, as Tormey and Moffitt have concluded, populism 
draws from the crisis context, which it highlights, translating it into a call for direct 
and decisive action able to promise the resolution of the problem at hand, whether this 
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is about the collapse of trust between the citizenry and its elected representatives, or 
about any number of other grievances: immigration, social injustice, etc. (Moffitt and 
Tormey, 2014, pp. 391-2; also see Roberts, 1995). And yet, does that mean that 
populism is exclusively associated with a pre-existing crisis? Or is it simply the case 
that a crisis can often benefit its development and wider political appeal? And how 
does that happen? Indeed, some commentators conceive of the connection between 
crisis and populism as a general tendency, but not as a determining condition or an 
essential criterion (Knight, 1998, p. 227; also see de la Torre, 2000, pp. 115-119). At 
any rate, the links between populism and crisis have not been adequately explored and 
theorized (Moffitt, 2015, p. 189). 
Very recently, Moffitt has critically revisited this body of work, introducing 
what has been presented as a novel take on crisis and populism that stresses the ways 
in which populist discourse is not merely a response to a pre-existing crisis, but also 
an active (performative) creator of ‘crisis’ at the level of representation, where its 
defining caracteristics are socially and discursively constructed (Moffitt, 2015; also 
see Moffitt, 2016). Summarizing the ongoing debate, we can introduce the following 
typology of the main existing approaches. 
 
Crisis as a triggering mechanism 
 
The most orthodox approach, cogently restated in recent years by Kenneth Roberts 
(Roberts, 2015), highlights the multiple ways in which a crisis situation operates to 
trigger populist mobilization. Of course, it is not any crisis, but a crisis of 
representation that is of interest here: ‘populism thus emerges as a probable – though 
hardly an inevitable or exclusive – political strategy for appealing to mass 
 8 
constituencies where representative institutions are weak or discredited, and where 
various forms of social exclusions or political marginalization leave citizens alienated 
from such institutions’ (Roberts, 2015, p. 141).  
Against such a crisis background, the appeal of populist discourse lies in its 
ability to connect anti-elite and anti-establishment discursive calls (supply side) to 
‘the political mobilization of the excluded and the alienated [demand side] – that is, to 
inspire popular subjects to rally, to protest, to strike, to organize, and/or to vote’ 
(Roberts, 2015, p. 142). Roberts goes on to distinguish between different types of 
such representation crises on the basis of the degree of institutional consolidation 
pertaining to different political cultures and national contexts, offering a variety of 
examples from the Argentinian crisis of 2001-2 to developments in Venezuela leading 
up to the Chavez phenomenon (Roberts, 2015, pp. 147-150). What is important, from 
our point of view, is that crisis clearly pre-exists a populist mobilization, which is 
conditioned by it. In other words, populism cannot make its presence felt before such 
a systemic failure starts short-circuiting the effective democratic representation of 
social interests, values and demands in the decision-making process through 
established parties and other intermediary organizations (Roberts, 2015, p. 147).  
 
Crisis as a performative construction 
 
Although Roberts repeatedly stresses the importance of representation (and its crisis) 
in accounting for populist phenomena, his understanding of ‘representation’ is a 
standard political science one, in which representation should be examined in 
dialogue with ‘the analysis of political parties, civil society, and social movements’ 
(Roberts, 2015, p. 155). This politically focused understanding of representation has 
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recently been shown as inadequate by Benjamin Moffitt (Moffitt, 2015). No doubt, 
Moffitt acknowledges the importance of the literature correlating populism with 
crisis; at the same time, he locates in it serious shortcomings. In particular, in his 
view, to conceptualize populism and crisis in external terms, to see crisis as an 
external triggering mechanism or a necessary pre-condition, does not allow political 
analysis register and reflect on the internal linkages between crisis and populism at 
the performative level. Hence, Moffitt insists on the importance of crisis as an 
essential (internal) characteristic of populism. Questioning the externality between the 
two (Moffitt, 2015, p. 211), he places emphasis on the performative construction of 
crisis by populist discourse itself: ‘if we do not have the performance of crisis, we do 
not have populism’ (Moffitt, 2015, p. 190). Here representation is primarily conceived 
in terms of symbolic articulation and performance. 
 In short, Moffitt identifies two important issues. First, crisis is never 
experienced as something given, obeying a simple causal explanation. Second, crisis 
never becomes accessible for us in some ‘objective’ and ‘neutral’ manner. The real of 
the crisis can only become (partially) accessible through some kind of mediation, 
through its performative construction by populist discourse. Here Moffitt directly 
refers to the Lacanian distinction between the Real and the Symbolic: ‘To more 
widely invoke Slavoj Žižek’s (1999) reading of Lacan –  there may very well be a 
Real in which crisis operates, but we cannot access it because our language remains at 
the level of the Symbolic. As such, crisis is very much what we make of it’. What this 
means is that, ultimately, ‘populist actors actively perform and perpetuate a sense of 
crisis, rather than simply reacting to external crisis’ (Moffitt, 2015, p. 195). Thus, 
Moffitt’s approach concludes that crises are never ‘neutral’  phenomena, but involve 
complex mediations ‘performed’  by certain political actors: ‘populist actors actively 
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participate in the “spectacularization of failure”  that underlies crisis, allowing them to 
pit “the people”  against a dangerous other, radically simplify the terms and terrain of 
political debate and advocate strong leadership and quick political action to stave off 
or solve the impending crisis’ (Moffitt, 2015, p. 198; also see Moffitt, 2016, p. 113-
132).  
 
Bridging the Gap: Dislocation, Radical Constructionism and Performativity 
 
Moffitt’s systematization of the debate is helpful and topical. However, it relies on the 
staging of certain oppositions that may partially obscure what is at stake, instead of 
fully illuminating it. On the one hand, he does register the fact that the two 
approaches to the relationship between crisis and populism are not mutually 
exclusive. Arguably, without a real systemic blockage, a collapse of trust and a failure 
within established modes of representation, there is no space created for political 
outsiders/newcomers to put forward their supposedly superior claim to represent (to 
voice) the frustrated popular will in a potentially hegemonic way. And yet, Moffitt is 
correct to question a simplistic view that would posit some sort of automatic causal 
link between ‘objective’ crisis and populism. As we have seen, Gramsci and, even 
more clearly, Colin Hay, have highlighted the importance of mediating mechanisms 
beyond ‘objective’ conditions. Moffitt himself refers to Colin Hay’s work, which has 
highlighted the importance of constructions of the ‘crisis’ beyond any systemic 
‘failure’ that pre-exists (Moffitt, 2015, p. 197):  
crisis and failure simply cannot be equated. Crises are representations, and 
hence ‘constructions’ of failure. […] Such perceived and identified 
failures thus form the basis for contested and competing constructions and 
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mediations of crisis which attempt to find and construct resonance with 
individuals’ and groups’ experiences of the symptoms of failure (Hay, 
1995, p. 68). 
In this sense, Moffitt’s work seems to be summarizing a long tradition arguing that 
systemic failure and ‘crisis’ – that is to say crisis narratives – are not to be confused 
with each other. And, of course, one should also add here that such constructions are 
not the exclusive privilege of populist political actors. Interestingly enough, Hay 
emphasizes the way the thatcherite New Right has constructed the so-called ‘winter of 
discontent’ through a particular narration of state and economic failure, which 
prioritized neoliberal solutions (Hay, 1995, p. 71).  
Apart from summarizing a whole theoretical tradition, the added value here is 
obviously the application of this rationale in the analysis of populism (Moffitt, 2015, 
p. 208). And yet, performing this leap seems to presuppose a certain casualty. Indeed, 
one cannot help but be struck by the way Moffitt positions Laclau’s contribution to 
this debate on the side of the supposed defenders of ‘external’, ‘objective’ crisis as a 
trigger for populism (Moffitt, 2016, p. 115). What is ignored here is, firstly, Laclau’s 
social constructionist emphasis on discourse, beyond any objectivist rationale. 
Second, and most importantly, the way in which, already from 1990 and through a 
debate with Zizek on the Lacanian Real – which, as we have seen, Moffitt cites as one 
of his own main inspirations – Laclau will introduce the concept of ‘dislocation’ as 
the (inherent) limit of (socially constructed) social objectivity, the moment of failure  
that ruptures our established reality and opens up an antagonistic play between 
competing discursive articulations struggling to impose a new hegemony (Laclau, 
1990). Thus, together with Moffitt (and Lacan and Zizek), Laclau will accept the gap 
between Real (objectivity) and Symbolic (social construction), between ‘failure’ and 
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‘crisis’ in Hay’s schema (Laclau, 2003; 2004). However, contra Moffitt, he will also 
register and conceptualize the continuous encounters between them, highlighting the 
inherent link between the two dimensions, something ranking low in Moffitt’s 
priorities. This is a crucial perspective, recently highlighted by cultural political 
economy as well: ‘crises offer a real-time laboratory to study the dialectic of semiosis 
and materiality’ (Sum & Jessop, 2013, p. 397). 
Indeed, already from the early 1990s, Laclau had introduced – following a 
significant debate with Zizek – the concept of ‘dislocation’, the kernel of his argument 
in New Reflections (Laclau, 1990, pp. 39-60) and arguably his most important 
conceptual innovation throughout this whole decade (Stavrakakis, 2007, pp. 73-4). 
Here disclocation is first understood as the moment of failure and subversion of a 
system of representation. Although dislocations are embodying a radical negativity – 
as encounters with the Real, they have no positive content (symbolic meaning) in 
themselves (Lacan) – and cannot be predicted by any kind of determinist philosophy 
of history (Gramsci), they have certain important consequences for our socio-
symbolic reality. This is due to the fact that besides their negative character they also 
entail a positive, productive dimension. If, as Laclau puts it, on the one hand they 
threaten established identities, on the other, they introduce a lack of meaning that 
constitutes the foundation on which new identities are formed (Laclau, 1990, p. 39). 
In other words, if dislocations destabilize existing identifications and discourses, at 
the same time they trigger new constructions. The latter attempt to suture the 
dislocated structure by narrating the ‘crisis’ in a mythical way, thus legitimizing 
particular solutions against others within the struggle for hegemony (Laclau, 1990, pp. 
63, 65).  
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This way, Laclau’s take on the dual character of dislocation manages to link 
the two orientations we have encountered: a dislocation, the failure of a sedimented 
system of representation (in both its senses, the traditionally political used by scholars 
like Roberts and the more constructionist used by Moffitt), is presupposed as a 
triggering mechanism for new populist (and other) discursive constructions uniquely 
narrating its characteristics and offering distinct solutions. And yet, far from being 
determined by the ‘objectivity’ of the dislocatory situation, these new articulations 
(populist or other) involve radical antagonistic construction. In New Reflections, 
Laclau uses the example of the German economic crisis of the 1920s to illustrate these 
points with a historical example. This crisis had ‘devastating effects for the middle 
classes’ to the extent that it involved a ‘generalized dislocation of traditional patterns 
of life’. The lack created by these dislocations played an important role in triggering 
the articulation of Nazi discourse and in increasing its hegemonic appeal: ‘The 
National Socialist discourse emerged as a possible response to the crisis and offered a 
principle of intelligibility for the new situation’ (Laclau, 1990, p. 65). Four points 
need to be highlighted here vis-à-vis Laclau’s position: 1. This discourse was only ‘a 
possible response’ and not the only response; 2. The new orientation it offered, the 
new principle of intelligibility on account of which it purported to meaningfully frame 
the crisis and articulate appealing solutions, involved a mythical Arian fantasy and an 
extreme example of blame attribution: the demonization of the Jews; 3. This new 
intelligibility ‘is not something that stemmed necessarily from the crisis itself’ 
(Laclau, 1990, p. 65) – it involved processes of performative construction; 4. The 
catastrophic implications of the aforementioned example and the barbaric nature of 
Nazi ideology should not make us attribute this choreography between social 
dislocation, crisis narrative, mythical framing and blame attribution – a choreography 
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implicating a plurality of competing actors – to some sort of ‘essentially primitive’ 
impulses akin to an ‘outbreak of irrationality’ (Laclau, 1990, p. 67). On the contrary, 
‘myth [as well as this whole dialectic] is constitutive of every possible society’, of 
every discursive articulation with hegemonic pretensions (Laclau, 1990, p. 67): ‘The 
welfare state, for example, was a myth aimed at reconstructing the operation of 
capitalist societies following the Great Deppression’. 
 Such constructions are radical because they involve retroactivity. Indeed, a 
radical retroactive ontology constitutes the cornerstone of Ernesto Laclau’s theory of 
populism as formulated in his book On Populist Reason: ‘the construction of the 
“people” is a radical one – one which constitutes social agents as such, and does not 
express a previously given unity of the group’ (Laclau, 2005a, p. 118). The ‘people’ is 
always something retroactively constructed, an empty signifier that needs to be 
invoked, a call incarnated in a proper name that (partially) creates what it is supposed 
to be expressing (a sovereign collective identity). It is clear then that Laclau does not 
fit the side in which he is placed in the opposition between ‘objectivists’ and 
‘constructionists’ Moffitt stages, between those that stress the ‘externality’ of crisis to 
populism and those, like Moffitt himself, who highlight their internal relation. 
Laclau’s work is clearly located beyond such oppositions; by highlighting the political 
choreography between Real (dislocation) and Symbolic (articulation), between 
externality and internality, he arguably manages to advance a more nuanced account 
of populist politics.  
Clearly indicative of such a rigorous and innovative orientation is the central 
place Laclau himself attributes to ‘performativity’ and the dimension of 
‘performance’ in his late work on populism. Performativity is here registered as one 
of the attributes of the aforementioned radical construction (Laclau, 2005a, p. 103). In 
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this schema, populist discourse always ‘tries to operate performatively within a social 
reality which is to a large extent heterogeneous and fluctuating. I see this moment of 
vagueness and imprecision – which, it should be clear, does not have any pejorative 
connotation for me — as an essential component of any populist operation’ (Laclau, 
2005a, p. 118; emphasis added). Thus, already from 2005 Laclau had indeed put 
forward the ‘foundations’ of a performative theory of populism,1 in ways not far from 
the ‘model’ proposed by Moffitt. Social failure is constructed and performatively 
narrated as a crisis attributed to the action of an enemy (the oligarchy) simultaneously 
triggering the radical construction of the people : 
If I refer to a set of social grievances, to widespread injustice, and 
attribute its source to the ‘oligarchy’, for instance, I am performing two 
interlinked operations: on the one hand, I am constituting the ‘people’ by 
finding the common identity of a set of social claims in their opposition to 
the oligarchy; on the other, the enemy ceases to be purely circumstantial 
and acquires more global dimensions. […] we are dealing not with a 
conceptual operation of finding an abstract common feature underlying all 
social grievances, but with a performative operation constituting the chain 
as such (Laclau, 2005a, p. 97; emphasis added).2 
 
Enter Antagonism: Populism vs. Anti-populism 
 
One more important conclusion follows from this discussion. It is never only one 
political force that is engaged in the aforementioned hegemonic play, a single force 
performing – within a socio-political vacuum – its solipsistic staging of the crisis. And 
this is not merely an empirical observation. It follows from the irreducible gap itself 
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between real failure and performatively constructed crisis highlighted up to now. This 
gap can be bridged in a variety of ways leading to the formation of antithetical 
political projects: ‘various political forces can compete in their efforts to present their 
particular objectives as those which carry out the filling of that lack’ (Laclau, 1996, p. 
44). This is, after all, what hegemony is about, something also stressed by cultural 
political economy:  
a crisis is a moment for contestation and struggle to construe it and inform 
individual and collective responses. This involves, among other issues, 
[…] identifying rightly or wrongly purported causes (agential, structural, 
discursive and technical) (Sum & Jessop, 2013, p. 398). 
Most available analyses of populism – including the one by Moffitt – ultimately 
fail to take into account this wider hegemonic environment within which populist 
actors have to operate. The latter are obviously never alone in identifying failures and 
in constructing crises by attributing blame and offering solutions. Most important, if 
they, quite often, invest on continuously propagating ‘crisis’, this strategy has to be 
placed within a wider antagonism between populism and anti-populism, which may 
result from the populist framing of the crisis but cannot be reduced to it. And here 
populists are not the only ones engaging in blame attribution, simplistic solutions and 
moral condemnation.3 How can populism research disavow the fact that ‘crisis does 
not come pre-interpreted but is often profoundly disorienting, creating space for 
alternative, often contested, construals and crisis responses, with different subjects 
likely to adopt different stances’? (Sum & Jessop, 2013, p. 396).  
In fact, very often, the designation ‘populist’ – with all its historically 
sedimented negative connotations of irresponsibility, demagogy and/or anti-
democratic tendencies – is attributed by mainstream parties and media to oppositional 
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political forces and discourses – irrespective of their ideological orientation – in order 
to radically undermine their hegemonic potential. Whenever deep systemic failures 
and dislocations destabilize a hegemonic order, encouraging the dealignment of a 
party system on the basis of crisis constructions endangering its smooth reproduction, 
established forces put forward their own constructions of the crisis, disavowing all 
responsibility and – very often – identifying populism as the main root-cause. No 
doubt, ‘[s]uccessfully to blame one set of factors and/or actors deflects blame from 
oneself and sets the stage for efforts to resolve matters’ (Sum & Jessop, 2013, p. 399). 
What is also at stake in such blame attribution is the exact nature of the crisis: 
whether, that is to say, it will be designated as a ‘crisis in’ or a ‘crisis of’:  
Crises ‘of ’ a system are less common. They occur when there is a crisis 
of crisis management (i.e., normal responses no longer work) and efforts 
to defer or displace crises encounter growing resistance. Such crises are 
more disorienting than crises ‘in’, indicating the breakdown of previous 
regularities and an inability to ‘go on in the old way’ (Sum & Jessop, 
2013, p. 398). 
Populist contenders usually portray the crisis as an internal ‘crisis of’ the previously 
hegemonic status quo (and its built-in crisis management apparatus), thus 
necessitating systemic renewal brough about by actors outside the crisis-ridden 
system (the populist contenders themselves). By contrast, established forces can only 
represent the crisis as a ‘crisis in’ the system, attributing the difficulties encountered 
in its management to predominantly ‘external’ factors, even if these factors can be 
also illustrated as having contaminated a system’s internal functions: to the populist 
threat itself.  
 18 
At any rate, this antagonistic choreography obviously needs to be thoroughly 
registered within a comprehensive theory of populism. In fact, its continuous re-
emergence is far from coincidental within our political tradition. Throughout history, 
signifiers like ‘the people’ invariably function as markers of the internal division of 
every political community between part and whole, between the few and the many, 
those governing and those governed, those inside and those outside, those above and 
those below. This division seems to traverse the development of European if not 
global societies from Greek and Roman antiquity up until modernity, setting the stage 
for an often bitter political antagonism. Here, it is typically two sides that are involved 
and they can be equally vitriolic. The most classic illustration of this antagonism is 
offered by William Shakespeare in Coriolanus. Indeed, Shakespeare gives us both 
sides of the argument in their most extreme formulations. On the one hand, we have 
the patrician view of the people: there is talk, among others, of the ‘beastly plebeians’, 
surely a precursor of Burke’s swinish multitude (3.1.66). On the other hand, we have 
the popular standpoint, with the accusations being directed towards the patricians 
(1.1.16). 
The French Revolution constitutes a turning point here: through the elevation of 
the ‘people’ into the model of democratic political subjectivity it gives birth to two 
opposing modern traditions. One that recognizes the importance and, sometimes, even 
idealizes the people and another that stresses the dangers involved in mass 
mobilizations and, often, demonizes the people. In institutional terms this is translated 
into different models of modern democracy: discarding or embracing ‘popular 
sovereignty’, discouraging or encouraging popular participation, supporting 
democratic elitism (Schumpeter, 2003, pp. 284-5) or ‘populistic democracy’ (Dahl, 
2006). During certain periods the clash between the two models, between populism 
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and elitist anti-populism, subsides and (paradoxical) agonistic articulations emerge 
instituting a temporary truce; this is what Chantal Mouffe calls the democratic 
paradox (Mouffe, 2000). But the antagonism can always re-emerge, especially in 
times of systemic failure and crisis of representation. The pejorative designation 
‘populist’ acquires increased importance within the language games marking such 
periods of democracy in crisis. Unable to openly castigate the people, within a 
political system still nominally founded on ‘popular sovereingty’, elitist forces attack 
‘populism’, which is performatively constructed in a way condensing all democratic 
pathologies (crisis) and legitimizing elitist solutions, a claim to ‘govern without the 
people’ (Crouch, 2004; Ranciere, 2006).  
At any rate, a rigorous theorization of populist politics will greatly benefit 
from placing emphasis on the antagonism between populist and anti-populist 
discourse and the way it shapes the identity of both emerging camps. As we know 
from Saussure, identity is impossible to formulate without difference: the meaning of 
a particular element within a system of signification can only arise via its 
differentiation from other elements within the same system: ‘in language there are 
only differences’ (Saussure, 1959, p. 120; also see Connolly, 1991, p. ix). In this light, 
to take into account the way populism and anti-populism mutually constitute each 
other should be considered an essential aspect of a constructionist, performative 
perspective on populism and crisis. Populism is inconceivable without anti-populism; 
it is impossible to effectively study the first without carefully examining the second. 
And yet, how helpful is such a hypothesis in analyzing particular empirical examples?  
 
 20 
The Greek Case: Crisis, Egalitarian Populism and Anti-populist Reaction in 
Southern Europe  
 
Crisis, articulation, polarization 
 
In many international contexts, economic and social dislocations (from Argentina’s 
default in the early 2000s to the Greek debt crisis within the last few years) have 
triggered a crisis of representation that served as the springboard for a populist 
politicization. If the preceding argument is correct then the emergence of populist 
movements cannot be properly interpreted if one does not place them within the 
context of such failures of social reproduction and the resulting crisis of 
representation. In addition, the antagonistic type of politicization put forward by 
populist political actors seems to construct and perform the crisis in a particular 
(confrontational) way in a bid to represent marginalized popular demands and effect 
systemic change. Last but not least, this project is bound to face anti-populist 
reactions. Especially in times of crisis, when ruling elites fail to deal with economic 
frustration and social dislocation, allowing thus systemic inconsistencies to develop 
into a deep crisis of representation, calls for political radicalization are often and 
summarily denounced as ‘populist’ in a bid to limit a ‘crisis in’ develop into a ‘crisis 
of’.  
In this section we explore the populist character of movements against 
austerity and party formations representing them in Greece, namely SYRIZA. This is 
attempted in a way highlighting the dialectic between their dynamic emergence and 
the way in which economic and social dislocations were translated into a crisis of 
representation triggering the formation of particular (radical democratic and thus 
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antagonistic) populist narrations of and solutions to the crisis, and, at the same time, 
stimulating anti-populist reactions. This case selection was not only based on the 
importance Greece has acquired throughout the European crisis as an experimental 
laboratory of socio-economic and political developments (Stavrakakis, 2013), with 
SYRIZA operating as the catalyst of a realignemnet of the collapsing party system 
around new political frontiers. In addition, and because of its populist profile, 
SYRIZA seems to have charted a path that other inclusionary forces are also partially 
following in the European South (Spain and Portugal) and beyond (the Corbyn and 
Sanders phenomena may not be completely unrelated). Operating at the antipodes of 
the dominant euro-centric model in populism research that often reduces populist 
politics to the extreme right, researching the Greek case may be pivotal in determining 
whether this new populist tide should be debated in terms of a historical anomaly or a 
slow and perhaps incoherent paradigm shift. 
Having initially emerged as a marginal coalition of radical left parties and 
groups, SYRIZA has followed a process of organizational consolidation that, 
following its impressive results in the May and June 2012 elections (catapulting it 
from the 4,6% it received in 2009 to 26,8%), has managed to come first with 36,4% of 
the vote in the 2015 elections, something that allowed its leader, Alexis Tsipras, to 
form a coalition government with the right-wing populist party ANEL (see 
Katsambekis 2015, 2016). Radically diverging from the euro-centric conventional 
wisdom which stereotypically casts populism as reactionary, nationalist, xenophobic, 
exclusionary and anti-European (see, for example, Berezin, 2009; Goodwin, 2011; 
Meijers, 2011; Painter, 2013), SYRIZA embraced the project of a politically 
integrated and solidary Europe, defended immigrants and socially marginalized 
sectors and pressed for a strong social rights agenda, claiming to fight for popular 
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sovereignty, social justice and democratization (Spourdalakis, 2014; Stavrakakis and 
Katsambekis, 2014).  
Such a project acquired salience against the background of the post-
democratic mutation of the post-transition regime in Greece (Metapolitefsi) and its 
dislocation. From 1974, when the dictatorship in Greece collapsed, onwards, a two-
party system prevailed in which New Democracy and PASOK, centre-right and 
centre-left, alternated in power. The policies of the two parties gradually converged, 
under conditions very similar to those encountered in other European cases, thus 
triggering a latent crisis of representation, already from the 1990s.  
 However, what dislocated the integrity of the system – obviously in a much 
more radical way in Greece than in Spain or Portugal – were the systemic failures 
associated with the 2008 global economic collapse and the way it has been 
adiministered by dominant elites (Kioupkiolis, 2014; Stavrakakis, 2013). During this 
period, in Greece, GDP contracted by 20% (between 2008 and 2012) and 
unemployment soared to 27% with youth unemployment reaching 60%, prompting 
humanitarian concern (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Societies, 2013). It was, however, the management of these systemic failures by the 
established political class, provocatively described by Saskia Sassen as an ‘economic 
version of ethnic cleansing’ (Sassen, 2014, p. 36), which resulted in a wider 
intensification of social dislocations that deepened the indignation and discontent for 
the dominant regime of democratic representation (two party system) established after 
the transition to democracy, stimulating massive protest movements (including 
demonstrations, strikes and square occupations).  
In this context, the role of the Greek Indignados (Aganaktismenoi) has been 
crucial (Pappas, 2014, p. 83). They constituted quite a massive but heterogeneous 
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movement, convened on the basis of calls in the social media, inviting people to 
express its outrage against austerity, the established party system and the state of 
democratic representation (Katsambekis, 2014, pp. 180-184). The positions of the 
movement were marked by a distinct ‘proto-populist’ flavour: the people have been 
betrayed by the elites, which are to blame for the socio-economic collapse. As a 
result, the elites should not represent the people anymore and ‘real’ or ‘direct’ 
democracy should be sought (Prentoulis and Thomassen, 2013). Already in this 
discursive articulation the problem is given a particular meaning, blame is attributed 
and a future orientation is charted. 
And yet, institutions have remained largely impervious to these demands 
allowing a ‘crisis in’ to develop into a ‘crisis of’ the system. At this juncture, certain 
social actors started searching for new vehicles of political representation that would 
overcome the fragmentation and the political impotence of the multitudes, organizing 
them and gaining access to power. Indeed, it was obviously impossible for the 
ensuing frustration, anger and despair to leave party identification and the political 
process untouched throughout a series of consecutive early elections (twice in 2012 
and then in early 2015). The parties affected included those entrusted by the troika to 
implement tough austerity policies. Some of them have all but collapsed (like PASOK) 
with the main beneficiary being a former outsider, SYRIZA. SYRIZA thus emerged 
from the sidelines as a new mythical response to the crisis of political representation, 
as populism often does, a crisis it partly construed by attributing the blame for the 
socio-economic dislocation experienced since 2008 to the economic and political 
establishment (both national and European) in order to legitimize a populist re-
democratization.    
 24 
Now, if SYRIZA – a party that previously exhibited no populist characteristics 
(Stavrakakis and Katsambekis, 2014, p. 127) –  can now be designated as populist 
then this surely follows from the central role reserved for ‘the people’ within its crisis 
discourse as well as from the fact that it divides the social space into two opposing 
camps: ‘them’ (the ‘establishment’) and ‘us’ (‘the people’), power and the underdog, 
the elite (domestic and European) and the non-privileged, those ‘up’ and the others 
‘down’: 
They have decided without us, so we are moving ahead without them. [...] 
NOW is the time to vindicate the struggles of our people, to punish and 
defeat the two-party system, to condemn the memoranda and the troika. 
[...] to create the conditions for an alternative governance, with the people 
in the leading role (SYRIZA, 2012, p. 1). 
Within this dichotomic framework, blame for the crisis is attributed towards the 
‘external troika’ (institutions like the IMF, the ECB and the European Commission) 
and its local ‘collaborators’, the so-called ‘internal troika’ (see, on this aspect, the 
relevant research of Stavrakakis and Katsambekis, 2014, p. 131). This narrative has 
been successful in articulating a variety of heterogeneous reactions and emotions 
against austerity into a new – retroactively and radically constructed – political 
subject (‘the people in the leading role’), thus ascribing to SYRIZA’s confrontational 
populism a hegemonic appeal. Thus, the ‘proto-populism’ of certain (anti-austerity) 
social movements was gradually transformed into party populism engaging with 
representation and representative institutions at a much deeper level.  
 
The anti-populist factor 
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It is impossible to understand the turn of events in Greece and the salience acquired 
by populist discourses such as the one articulated by anti-austerity movements and 
taken up by SYRIZA in the context of the European crisis, without taking into 
account the broader environment within which it operated. This is clearly marked by 
the emergence and consolidation of a discursive frontier between populism and anti-
populism, which influences the constitution of both fronts on the basis of their 
antithetical crisis narratives, of their antithetical political mythologies. In other words, 
the lack of meaning created by the social dislocations associated with the economic 
collapse and the implementation of the bail-out agreements has necessitated the 
supply of surfaces of inscription, of principles of intelligibility, allowing for a 
meaningful symbolization of the crisis, explaining its causes and sketching potential 
solutions. Not surprisingly, the populist framing has not been the only one on offer. 
In the case of Greece, and due to the relatively long duration of the crisis and 
the international attention developments in the country have received, anti-populist 
discourses have created a deep discursive divide that on top of crosscuting Greek 
society has also acquired international salience. For example, in July 2012 Der 
Spiegel has reserved a prominent place for Tsipras within ‘Europe’s Ten Most 
Dangerous Politicians’ precisely on these grounds: ‘Reckless Rhetoric from Europe’s 
Populists’ (see, for more examples, ranging from the Guardian to the Financial Times, 
Stavrakakis and Katsambekis, 2014, p. 120). In the domestic context, it is clear that 
the radical politicization and antagonistic contestation staged and performed in 
SYRIZA’s populist discourse, has created a vitriolic backlash denouncing SYRIZA’s 
project as ‘populist’ in the most extreme pejorative sense of the term. If, in populist 
discourses, the ‘people’ operate as a positively charged empty signifier allowing the 
articulation of heterogeneous demands in a common political project, in anti-populist 
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discourse, ‘populism’ functions like such an empty signifier, but this time a negatively 
charged one: as a discursive vessel capable of comprising an excess of heterogeneous 
meanings, operating as the synecdoche of an omnipresent evil and associated with 
irresponsibility, demagogy, immorality, corruption, destruction, and irrationalism 
(Stavrakakis, 2014, p. 509). In a book entitled Populism, Anti-populism and Crisis, 
Sevastakis and Stavrakakis have analyzed in depth this rampant anti-populist 
discourse that has dominated established parties and media in Greece. From former 
prime minister Samaras (leader of New Democracy) and former vice-premier 
Venizelos (leader of PASOK) to many journalists of mainstream media, the idea is 
that populism is eveywhere and constitutes perhaps the most grave danger for Greece 
and Europe (Stavrakakis, 2014, pp. 509-510).  
Thus, in the discourse articulated by established parties against the newcomer 
SYRIZA, love of country was contrasted with the ‘appearance of extremists and 
populists’ (Samaras, 2013) with populism presented as ‘the greatest enemy of Greece’ 
(Hatzidakis, 2011). What is also striking is that this polarized anti-populist 
representation has remained at the forefront of anti-SYRIZA rhetoric even after the 
party’s capitulation and the acceptance of a new memorandum with the troika. Hence, 
in November 2015 ex-prime minister Samaras castigated populism as a ‘disease’ 
(Samaras, 2015); no wonder that, upon congratulating the new leader of his party, the 
only thing he did stress was, once more, the need for New Democracy to unite in 
order ‘to embrace all Greeks and win conclusively the battle against populism’ 
(Samaras, 2016). But this was something that the new leader, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, 
had already highlighted in his acceptance speech: ‘We have one goal. New 
Democracy must express all the forces in this land confronting the populism of an 
incompetent government’ (Mitsotakis in Ta Nea, 2016). 
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This extreme anti-populist rhetoric is not restricted within partisan political 
antagonism. It also marks the field of the media. Using qualitative and lexicometric 
methods, we have surveyed a series of corpora constructed on the basis of a total of 
17,363 articles to which we had access, published in the Greek printed press between 
1 June 2014 and 31 May 2015 (Nikisianis, Siomos, Stavrakakis and Dimitroulia, 
2016). What emerges from this analysis is, once more, a clear division between 
ostensibly ‘anti-populist’ and ‘pro-populist’ media. What emerges as well is the 
polarization implicit in pro-populist discourse, but also the demonization of ‘populism’ 
(and the political forces denounced as populist, mainly SYRIZA) in the anti-populist 
press. Indeed, common adjectives marking references to populism in this camp 
comprise the following: extreme, vulgar, dangerous, cheap, fanatical, clientelist, 
catastrophic, unbearable, lumpen, irresponsible, savage, total, unscrupulous, etc. In a 
similar vein, a lot of metaphors utilized in forming sentences about populism emanate 
from medical discourse and associate it with some sort of illness, either of the body 
(contamination, plague, gangrene, cancer, etc.) or of the soul (madness, schizofreneia, 
irrationality, etc.). Another salient category of metaphors employed originate from the 
natural sciences, especially meteorology (tsunami, storm, etc.) and zoology, either 
real (parasite, wolfe, etc.) or imaginary (beast, monster, etc.).4 
This discourse is far from restricted to fringe journalists and media; it 
constitutes a prominent feature of mainstream media and celebrity journalists. The 
case of Alexis Papachelas, singled out by the news portal Politico as one of ‘the 
twenty eight people from twenty eight countries who are shaping, shaking and stirring 
Europe’ is indicative (Politico, 2015). As editor-in-chief and leading columnist of the 
centre-right daily Kathimerini, Papachelas has published, throughout the last few 
years, numerous articles on populism invariably utilizing the metaphor of the ‘beast’. 
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Already from 2010 he refers to the ‘beast of populism’, to which in 2014 he will 
attribute all that has gone wrong in post-authoritarian Greece:  ‘All that angers us has 
an explanation and is not a momentary product, for it took several decades for the 
hungry beast of populism to rear its ugly head’ (Papachelas, 2014). The repertoire of 
monstrosity will continue to feed this anti-populist discourse well into 2015, when at 
least seven articles will be published utilizing this metaphor (18/3/2015, 12/7/2015, 
14/7/2015, 23/7/2015, 9/8/2015, 16/8/2015, 8/11/2015). 
What should not escape our attention here is that, exactly like populist 
discourse, anti-populism is also flourishing on the ground of the crisis, only by 
constructing it in a very different way, attributing its causes to populism itself: in the 
Greek case, for example, to the dominance of a populist culture throughout 
metapolitefsi that corrupted democracy, excesively distributing democratic rights 
(Sevastakis, 2012, pp. 10-11, 15). In this sense, we see that whenever the problem of 
ascribing meaning arises, of representing deep economic and societal dislocations, 
different actors are bound to articulate opposing narratives attributing the blame to 
different forces and proposing alternative solutions. When the crisis takes on a form 
dismantling the established consensus on the institutions and legitimacy of democratic 
representation, extreme polarization is likely to emerge juaxtaposing different models 
of democracy, an elitist gouvérnement de Raison vs. a radical participatory one 
(Sevastakis, 2012, p. 29). In the ensuing discursive battle between populism and anti-
populism, both sides performatively employ simplification of what is at stake and 
demonization of their enemy.  
And this is something far from restricted to our case-study. The situation in 
Spain is very similar, with PODEMOS blaming ‘la casta’ for the crisis and 
mainstream media and politicians blaming PODEMOS on the basis of their 
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irresponsible populism (Kioupkiolis, 2016). Outside Europe as well, in Venezuela for 
instance, the 2013 by-election has seen government and opposition employing 
‘equally strident’ discourses claiming ‘to embody the will of the Venezuelan people’ 
against their ‘corrupt’ opponent (Hawkins, 2015). In addition, this point is valid not 
only at the synchronic but also at the diachronic level. Even the great – vitriolic – 
critic of American agrarian populism of the 1890s, the person who is probably 
responsible for the pejorative connotations of populism in academic discourse, 
Richard Hofstadter, had accepted, in a self-critical gesture, that: ‘If populist rhetoric, 
cited in isolation, sounds melodramatic, it is important to remember that an equally 
inflammatory rhetoric prevailed on the other side, in which the populists were 
portrayed as being at best deluded bumpkins and at worst primitives, demagogues, 
anarchists, and socialists’ (Hofstadter, 1969, p. 19). Isn’t it time to re-activate this 
long-forgotten insight? It always takes two to dance the populist/anti-populist tango. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Having briefly surveyed the literature on crisis and especially on its relevance for 
understanding populism, we have constructed a theoretical framework that draws on 
both main perspectives, one focusing on the importance of crises of political 
representation as external triggers of populism as well as another highlighting the 
need to take into account the performative staging of crisis as an internal feature of 
populist discursive constructions. We have tried to articulate both in a rigorous way, 
previously absent from populism research, by distinguishing between systemic 
failures (Real) and constructions of crisis (Symbolic), and yet registering at the same 
time the irreducible dialectic between the two. Moreover, this has allowed us to 
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radically expand the scope of analysis to capture the crucial, but very often neglected, 
antithesis between populism and anti-populism.  
Our focus on the recent and, as a result, under-researched example of SYRIZA 
has shown that more or less all the elements comprising such a theoretical framework 
are met in the empirical material. In the Greek case, socio-economic dislocations have 
trigerred a crisis of representation that facilitated the realignment of the party system, 
allowing a political actor like SYRIZA to hegemonize the field by performing a 
populist articulation of the crisis. Thus, all the different modalities of the relation 
between crisis and populism have been observed in ways vindicating a Laclau-
inspired negotiation between Real and Symbolic, dislocation and performative 
construction. Our analysis of the Greek case has also proved revealing in terms of 
demonstrating the need to always situate populist discursive constructions of crisis 
within the context of political antagonism. Would it be possible to adequately account 
for populist politics in Greece without taking into account the populism/anti-populism 
frontier? Without thematizing and researching anti-populist discourse? Without 
exploring its various sources, repertoires and blame attributions, especially its 
demonization of the beast of populism?  
What thus emerges is a distinct political choreography connecting populism, 
anti-populism and crisis, able to facilitate a more comprehensive theorization of 
populist politics with broader analytical implications. In formal terms, this 
choreography could be presented as follows:  
1. A deep economic and/or social dislocation is the necessary and yet insufficient 
starting point. 
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2. When this dislocation is identified and highlighted as a ‘crisis’, it is often narrated 
in ways blaming particular causes and their agents at the level of representation 
(populists typically blame the ‘establishment’).  
3. Simultaneously, a platform is articulated ‘in the name of the people’ to defend the 
victims of the crisis (the excluded, the impoverished, the underdog, the many).  
4. This articulation triggers an anti-populist reaction (which is, very often, the one 
designating as ‘populist’ those claiming to speak on behalf of ‘the people’). 
5. Both discourses emerging (populist and anti-populist) can, in principle, acquire a 
left-wing (inclusionary, egalitarian, participatory) or right-wing profile (exclusionary, 
elitist) and both employ simplification and demonization, often leading to the 
establishment of a polarized political culture. At any rate, it is impossible to 
adequately study populism without inquiring into anti-populism and vice-versa. 5 
Needless to say, many issues related to our argument remain to be explored 
and further debated. How are crises eventually – even partially and/or temporarily – 
resolved and how does the dialectic between Real and Symbolic overdetermine such 
resolutions, vindicating or frustrating populist and anti-populist diagnoses and 
promises? What is the exact status of the populism/anti-populism antithesis? Does it 
constitute, for example, an emerging cleavage? In what sense? In which contexts? Is 
the polarization introduced and cultivated both by many populist discourses and de 
facto emerging through the populism/anti-populism divide always a danger or can it 
also function as a corrective for representative democracy under conditions of post-
democratic mutation? In terms of the current European crisis, is a new paradoxical 
compromise between elitist and participatory forces in sight or will the intensification 
of the opposition between the two trends threaten to destabilize the future of the 
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European project? All these are open questions. Hopefully, the argumentation put 
forward in this paper will help future attempts to illuminate them. 
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Notes 
1. This is by no means to argue that Laclau should be exclusively evaluated as a 
‘theorist of populism’. Nevertheless, it was the (political and intellectual) challenges 
resulting from the Peronist experience that triggered his turn to Althusserianism 
(Laclau, 1990, pp. 198-9), initiating his whole theoretical trajectory. Then, in the 
1970s, it was Laclau himself that gave the title ‘Towards a Theory of Populism’ to 
one of his first major theoretical contributions (Laclau, 1977), something that was to 
be repeated several times up until the publication of The Populist Reason in 2005 
(Laclau, 2005a).  Indeed populism seems to have functioned throughout his career 
both as a challenge for strategic analysis and as an inspiration for theoretical and 
conceptual innovation. 
2. Although completely and paradoxically ignored in Moffitt’s early work, this aspect 
of Laclau’s contribution is thoroughy acknowledged in his newly published book 
(Moffitt, 2016, p. 40). 
3. It may initially seem that highlighting the antagonism between populist and anti-
populist forces contradicts Laclau’s assertion that populism is ultimately synonymous 
with politics (Laclau, 2005b, p. 13). And yet, even according to his own 
abstract/formal statement, politics (that is to say populism) does not exhaust the 
totality of our experience: ‘We have an end of politics when the community 
conceived as a totality, and the will representing that totality, become 
indistinguishable from each other. In that case, as I have argued throughout this essay, 
politics is replaced by administration and the traces of social division disappear’ 
(Laclau, 2005b, p. 48). Anti-populism, in the sense utilized in our paper, encompasses 
post-democraric discourses that would ideally replace politics with technocratic 
administration – what, in other words, constitutes populism’s ‘constitutive outside’. 
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This is also consistent with the basic distinction introduced in Hegemony and Socialist 
Strategy between the logics of equivalence and difference (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). 
Of course, in political reality, both abstract positions – pure populism and pure 
administration – are ultimately impossible and thus populism is always articulated 
with some sort of (differential) institutional logic in the making while anti-populism 
often acquires a confrontational (equivalential) character, incorporating peripheral 
populist elements and adopting a quasi-populist style. However, contra Laclau, we 
would argue that this mutual contamination does not justify the implicit degreeism – 
to use a diagnostical term introduced by Sartori – contaminating Laclau’s argument in 
this particular text: there is a point when, to use an old cliché, quantitative gradation 
becomes qualitative difference, when an antagonism between a political discourse 
claiming to represent a frustrated popular will and an administrative discourse 
aggressively justifying this frustration is crystallized along the lines of a 
populism/anti-populism frontier – otherwise, what is lost is the conceptual 
particularity of populism as a tool for concrete political analysis in the register of 
hegemony (Stavrakakis, 2004, p. 263). 
If certain slippages in Laclau’s discourse seem to allow for the articulation of 
a set of different and even antithetical possibilities in theorizing the relationship 
between hegemony, politics and populism, it seems clear enough that the most 
theoretically consistent and analytically suggestive option is to understand populism 
as ‘a species of the genus hegemony, the species that calls into question the existing 
order with the purpose of constructing another (122–3). This genus has at least one 
other species, institutionalist [anti-populist] discourse, whose essence is to maintain 
the status quo’ (Arditti, 2010, pp. 492-3). 
4. For similar metaphors utilized on the populist side, see Moffitt, 2015, p. 201. 
 35 
5. This model could be used in conjunction with that introduced by Moffitt as it helps 
to situate the latter within the broader frame of political antagonism and hegemonic 
struggle (Moffitt, 2015, pp 198; 2016, p. 121). 
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